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NOTE
THE USA PATRIOT ACT'S APPLICATION
TO LIBRARY PATRON RECORDS
Kathryn Martin*
"Throughout history, official surveillance of the reading hab-
its of citizens has been a litmus test of tyranny."
- Senator Sam Ervin'
I. INTRODUCTION
Would you like it if someone took a list of all the books that you
checked out of the library and based on that list tried to deduce your political
loyalties? For the intellectually curious, that would be a nightmare: who has
not tried to expand their understanding of the world by picking up a book on
a political system or history with which they disagree? In the past, law en-
forcement agents could access library patron records by showing probable
cause to get a warrant, but they had to use specific patron records for eviden-
tiary, not investigative purposes. With the 2001 passage of the USA
PATRIOT Act,2 the legislature allowed law enforcement agents to access a
library's patron records without requiring specificity or probable cause, so
long as protection against international terrorism is a significant purpose of
the investigation.3 In its application to library records, civil liberties activ-
ists feel that this broadened government power is unjustified: it will not pro-
vide useful intelligence information because patrons do not have access to
confidential information in libraries. Furthermore, investigation of library
patron records will have a "chilling effect" on patrons' use of the libraries;
afraid of being judged by their choice of certain books, people will limit
* Kathryn M. Martin, Candidate for J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 2004; B.A., University of Massa-
chusetts at Amherst, 1998. Thank you to Professor Geoffrey Bennett of the Notre Dame London Law Pro-
gramme for his thoughtfil suggestions and guidance in writing this Note.
I. HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, SURVEILLANCE IN THE STACKS: THE F.B.I.'S LIBRARY AWARENESS
PROGRAM 6 (1991) (quoting Senator Sam Ervin, Letter to the Secretary of the Treasury (1970)).
2. The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and
Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (hereinafter "USA PATRIOT Act"), Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 5, 8, 10, 12, 15, 16, 18, 21,22, 28, 31,42, 47, 49 and 50 U.S.C.).
3. The Act's "business records" section allows searches of library records. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001
§ 215, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1861-1862 (West Supp. 2002).
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their reading.4 Using reading lists for intelligence purposes ignores the mul-
titude of reasons people use libraries: for entertainment, for broadening hori-
zons, for scholastic purposes, for answering a question or assuaging curios-
ity. We read because "[t]he world is full of mostly invisible things/ [a]nd
there is no way but putting the mind's eye/ [o]r its nose, in a book, to find
them out."'5 The USA PATRIOT Act's broad powers, as they apply to li-
brary patron records, threaten our exploration of the world of ideas.
This Note will analyze the ways the USA PATRIOT Act disregards
the protection the Fourth Amendment gives library patron records. "Library
patron records" as discussed in this paper are limited to those records that
identify patrons and the books that the patrons have checked out of the li-
brary. This Note will not discuss searches of computer use in libraries.6
Section II of this paper will give the background necessary to analyze
the use of the USA PATRIOT Act. First, it outlines the history of the USA
PATRIOT Act and how it applies to library records. Next, it discusses the his-
tory of government investigations of library records, and the evolution of the
Fourth Amendment's application to government searches. Section III of this
paper tries to identify exactly what problems lie in the USA PATRIOT Act's
application to library records. Finally, Section IV suggests some alternatives to
the USA PATRIOT Act's heavy-handed approach to intelligence gathering, and
I argue for a special exception to the Act that would bring back the higher
search standards that library patron records have traditionally enjoyed.
II. THE USA PATRIOT ACT, SEARCHES, AND LIBRARY RECORDS
A. The USA PATRIOTAct is Born
In the past decade the USA faced an alarming wave of terrorist violence
on its own soil. Timothy McVeigh showed America that a disillusioned person
4. The "chilling effect," a fear-driven self-censorship, was first recognized by the Supreme Court in
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). "A chilling effect occurs when individuals seek-
ing to engage in activity protected by the First Amendment are deterred from so doing by governmental regu-
lation not specifically directed at that protected activity." Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amend-
ment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect, " 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978) (emphasis omitted). Librarians
specifically fear a chilling effect if library patrons, afraid of government misinterpretation of the books they
read, avoid controversial books or books on topics that the patron thinks the government might find suspect.
See id.
5. HOWARD NEMEROV, To David, About His Education, in TI-E COLLECTED POEMS OF HOWARD
NEMEROV 268, 268 (1977).
6. Numerous authors have already discussed the USA PATRIOT Act's application to Internet use. E.g.,
Peter Del Bianco, Jr. & F. Mark Terison, Is Big Brother Watching Out for Us?, 17 ME. B.J. 20 (2002); Amitai
Etzioni, Implications of Select New Technologies for Individual Rights and Public Safety, 15 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 257 (2002); Daniel J. Solove, Digital Dossiers and the Dissipation of Fourth Amendment Privacy, 75 S.
CAL. L. REv. 1083 (2002).
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or two could take the lives of close to two hundred victims in a single act with
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing.7 Another attack came on September 11,
2001, when a handful of terrorists hijacked civilian planes and used them as
weapons to destroy the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, killing thou-
sands.8 Both of these incidents are part of a new type of violence made possible
with modem technology and the evolution of guerilla war tactics.9 Under-
standably, the United States government, which had not seen such widespread
civilian casualties on its own soil since the Civil War,' ° was distressed at the
damage a few hard-to-trace individuals could inflict. Congress hurriedly passed
the USA PATRIOT Act," enabling more comprehensive tracking of individuals
and looser standards for intelligence gathering.
Proponents of the USA PATRIOT Act argue that with the continuing
threat of terrorist violence, law enforcement agents need flexibility and full
discretion to ferret out terrorists. Terrorists have been operating on Ameri-
can soil and have taken advantage of technology that makes them difficult to
7. Timothy McVeigh was convicted in June 1997 for the April 19, 1995 Oklahoma City Federal Build-
ing bombing that killed 168 people and injured over 500 others. Julie Delcour, McVeigh Dead; End is Quick,
Quiet for Man Behind Bombing, TULSA WORLD, June 12, 2001, at Al.
8. Nineteen terrorists linked to Al Quaeda, seven of whom had some pilot training, hijacked four planes.
PAUL L. WILLIAMS, AL QAEDA: BROTHERHOOD OF TERROR xix (2002). United Airlines Flight 175 and
American Airlines Flight I I crashed into the World Trade Center towers in New York killing 157 passengers
and crew and 2,792 people in the buildings. Todd Venezia, Mystery of a 9/11 Victim Who Lives, N.Y. POST,
Dec. 14, 2002, at 009. American Airlines Flight 77 crashed into the US Pentagon killing sixty-four passengers
and crew, and United Airlines Flight 93 crashed in Pennsylvania killing its forty-five passengers and crew.
Ben Fenton & Toby Helm, Seven Pilots Were Among 19 Hijackers, THE TELEGRAPH, Sept. 15, 2001, at
http://www.salon.com. Altogether, approximately ten thousand casualties (both dead and injured) resulted
from the September 11 attacks. John Podhoretz, Hollywood Searches for a New Script: Popular Culture after
September 11, in OUR BRAVE NEW WORLD: ESSAYS ON THE IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11, at 108 (Wladyslaw
Pleszczynski ed., 2002).
9. Guerilla fighters operate in small bands, sometimes organized, usually behind enemy lines and use
hit-and-run tactics and sabotage to surprise and torment the enemy. WORLD BOOK, INC., Guerilla Warfare, in
8 THE WORLD BOOK ENCYCLOPEDIA 419 (2001). When waged in cities, guerilla warfare often takes the form
of bombings, kidnapping, or other violent acts. Id.
10. The American Civil War of 1861-1865 was the last war fought on American soil. I do not include
Pearl Harbor in the count of domestic civilian casualties because Hawaii was a colony in 1941, and therefore
the attack was not an event on American soil. MICHAEL GANNON, PEARL HARBOR BETRAYED: THE TRUE
STORY OF A MAN AND A NATION UNDER ATrACK (2001). Furthermore, the 2,403 Americans killed, lost or
mortally injured in the Pearl Harbor attack were largely military, not civilian, although the United States was
not at war at the time. Id. at 235.
11. Jon Baumgarten et al., The Patriot [sic] Act Flies through Congress, 6 No. 9 CYBERSPACE LAW 15
(stating that the USA PATRIOT Act passed in a mere two days). At the time, there was some complaint that
the bill was pushed through Congress too hastily. Although he was a minority voice, Representative Bob Barr
(R-GA) questioned,
Why is it necessary to rush... [the USA PATRIOT Act] through?... Does it have any-
thing to do with the fact that the department has sought many of these authorities on
numerous other occasions, has been unsuccessful in obtaining them, and now seeks to
take advantage of what is obviously an emergency situation to obtain authorities that it
has been unable to obtain previously?
Byron York, The World that Did Not Change-Much: Partisanship and the Politics of National Security After
9/11, in OUR BRAVE NEW WORLD: ESSAYS ON THE IMPACT OF SEPTEMBER 11, at 28 (Wladyslaw Pleszczynski
ed., 2002).
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track, such as anonymous library Internet use and pay-as-you-go cellular
phone cards. Law enforcement agents claim to require broader access to
communications and business records to meet this intelligence challenge.
When information gathering is easier, authorities are more likely to intercept
terrorists' plans. The USA PATRIOT Act gives government agents this
freedom to gather information.
As it applies to library patron records, however, the Act is criticized
for the same broad powers that make this information collection possible.
There is a fear that this is a step backward to an era when government agents
investigated patron records in search of communists, Vietnam War dissent-
ers, and other parties perceived as anti-government. 12 Stripping privacy pro-
tections for all patrons, not just suspected terrorists, marks the end of the
privacy Americans enjoy in public libraries and the start of subjecting
Americans to searches of dubious value. The USA PATRIOT Act allows too
much invasion of citizens' privacy liberties' 3 in the doubtful hope of finding
terrorists.
Critics also claim that a synthesis of already collected information,
not an increase in what is collected, is the answer; the US Government now
collects so much information that it is "choking on more information than
[the agencies can] digest., 14
B. The USA PATRIOT Act's Application to Libraries
The USA PATRIOT Act allows a representative of a governmental
entity who has a rank no lower than the Assistant Special Agent in Charge of
the F.B.I. 15 must apply to either a federal District Court judge 6 or to a mag-
12. Solove, supra, note 6, at 1107-08. In addition to the F.B.I.'s Library Awareness Program, the U.S.
Army, the C.I.A. and various state and local police departments have been involved in sometimes extensive
information gathering operations, amassing files on U.S. citizens' reading habits, finances, health and "per-
sonal and sexual relationships that could be used to discredit them." Id. at 1108. For a description of the
Library Awareness Program, see infra note 33.
13. Among other things, the USA PATRIOT Act allows law enforcement agents secret access to Internet
and telephone communications, as well as allowing broad powers to search business records. USA PATRIOT
Act of 2001. See supra note 2. It is rumored that an earlier version of the USA PATRIOT Act would have
stripped even more liberties, such as suspending habeas corpus. Steve Bonta, The Un-American Patriot Act,
18 THE FREE REPUBLIC 01, (Jan. 14, 2002), at http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/ 723204/posts (last
visited Feb. 23, 2003). This version "'dumbfounded' members of Congress who read it .... It is disquieting
to know that someone in official Washington might be seriously thinking about curtailing the ancient protec-
tion against arbitrary and unjust imprisonment." Id.
14. James X. Dempsey, Civil Liberties in a Time of Crisis, 29 HuM. RTS. 8, 9 (2002) ("Sweeping in even
more information will not make the picture any clearer. In this way, the expanded surveillance powers are
likely to make counterterrorism efforts more inefficient.").
15. USA PATRIOT Act of200I § 215, 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2001).
16. Id. The judge can be in any district where "activities related to the terrorism may have occurred, for a
search of property or for a person within or outside the district." USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 219, FED. R.
CRIM. P. 41(b)(3) (2001) (emphasis added). This means that a judge could have no connection to the jurisdic-
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istrate judge 7 for a court order allowing the search of "all tangible things" in
the library. 18 This judge can be from the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act ("FISA") secret court.' 9 The agent does not need to allege any specific
facts to obtain this order, and foreign intelligence or investigation of terror-
ism only need to be "a significant purpose" of the search. 20  The application
for the court order must specify that the records are sought as part of an on-
going investigation and will be used to "obtain foreign intelligence informa-
tion not concerning a United States person or to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities .... , The library must fully
cooperate in the investigation of its records if presented with a court order,22
and librarians are bound to secrecy regarding the investigation.23 Neither the
librarians nor the library will be held liable for any harm that results from
their good faith compliance with the order.24
The Attorney General can authorize an emergency search that can
continue for up to seventy-two hours.25 If the Attorney General invokes the
emergency search power, he must immediately apply for a court order allow-
ing the search to continue.26
tion where the activities in question take place, and may be less equipped to judge the reasonableness of the
warrant.
17. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 215, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861.
18. Id. "All tangible things" include written records of patrons, documents, and any other items the
library might have recording patron activities. Id. The F.B.I. can also access any databases, Internet traffic,
anything stored on a computer hard drive in the library, and even backups of databases. USA PATRIOT Act
of 2001 § 203, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2510 (2001). The library can be required to disclose any computer files from the
past 180 days or less, if such files exist. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 212, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703 (2001). If
the library has the information, the library will have to disclose the patron's name, address, and records of
computer session times and duration. Id. The order will last for the time necessary to complete the investiga-
tion or ninety days, whichever is less (exceptions are provided for investigations outlined in 50 U.S.C.A. §
1801 as defined in 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (d) and 50 U.S.C.A. § 1824 (d)(l)). USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 §§
206, 207, 225, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1805 (2001). If necessary, the court can allow an extension. Id. Under 50
U.S.C.A. § 1842, the F.B.I. can also use wiretaps to trace library Internet use. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 §
214 (2001). The Internet tap is perhaps a more beneficial search, but one that has an even greater capacity to
chill intellectual exploration.
19. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 215,50 U.S.C.A. § 1861.
20. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 218, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1804 (a)(7)(B).
21. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 215, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861. The only exception to this is that a U.S.
citizen cannot be considered an agent of a foreign power solely based on activities protected by the First
Amendment. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 207,50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1805, 1824.
22. Chances are that the order will issue. The FISA Court, which hears warrant requests under the USA
PATRIOT Act, "has never turned down a surveillance request." The Limits of Trust, WASH. POST, Aug. 23,
2002, at A26.
23. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 215, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(d).
24. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 215,50 U.S.C.A. § 1861(e).
25. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 207, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1805(f), 1824(e).
26. Id. If the court denies the application to continue the search, then the search must stop immediately.
Id. The problem with this provision is that a good deal of privacy could be improperly invaded in the time
before a court rules on the application or in the seventy-two hours allowed by statute. Furthermore, it is hard
to imagine a situation necessitating immediate access to a list of someone's reading material.
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The USA PATRIOT Act also allows librarians to disclose patron in-
formation to law enforcement personnel if they have reason to believe that
there is an "emergency involving immediate danger of death or serious
physical injury to any person. ' 27
There are rumors that the government has used its USA PATRIOT
Act special powers to search libraries across the country.28 The gag order in
the Act prevents librarians from sharing with the public the extent and nature
of the secret warrants' use.
C. Privacy and the Library Patron Record: The "Chilling Effect"
Government searches of library patron records have a history. Fear-
ing communist activity, the post-World War II American government used
library records, among other sources, to find political dissidents. 29  The
1950's McCarthy era was marked with rampant misinformation and tenu-
ously based conclusions that led to "blacklists" and wrongful convictions.3 °
In response to the wave of political censorship and threats to intellectual
freedom, the American Library Association 31 wrote its Freedom to Read
Statement "which encouraged librarians and publishers to make available the
widest diversity of information and expression., 32 Ten years later, ignoring
warnings against quelling intellectual freedom by judging people based on
their reading material, the F.B.I. began amassing records on citizens, includ-
ing information on library use.33 These searches produced little or no useful
27. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 212, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b)(7).
28. "In July, several libraries across the nation said F.B.I. agents had demanded information on reading
records." Christopher Newton, Lawmakers Square off with Justice over Request for Patriot Act Disclosure,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Aug. 20, 2002, available at http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/nation/
20020820-1513-patriotact-congress.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2003).
29. Felicity Barringer, Using Books as Evidence Against Their Readers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2001, at
WK3.
30. RICHARD H. ROvERE, SENATOR JOE MCCARTHY (1959).
31. The American Library Association ("A.L.A.") is a professional organization of librarians.
32. FOERSTEL, supra note 1, at 1.
33. The American government first used library patron information as part of domestic surveillance in the
1960s. Id. at 4. These files were related to "domestic security, civil disturbances, and campus unrest and
generally did not result in criminal charges." Id. at 3-4. Sometime before the 1980s, the F.B.I. began its
unofficial "Library Awareness Program," Ulrika Ekman Ault, Note, The FB.l's Library Awareness Pro-
gram: Is Big Brother Reading Over Your Shoulder? 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532, 1535 (1990). The program
consisted of F.B.I. agents trying to enlist the assistance of librarians in monitoring the reading habits of'suspi-
cious individuals.' Id. at 1534. Congress never explicitly authorized this program. Id. at 1535. The Library
Awareness Program is vaguely defined and has no official title; "Library Awareness Program" is the term
F.B.I. officials reportedly gave librarians they approached, and the name the media picked up. Id. The Li-
brary Awareness Program has been described as a "ham-handed effort that betrayed insensitivity to the fact
that libraries are symbols of Americans' First Amendment rights. The idea of government agents scrutinizing
the reading material of library patrons was chilling." RONALD KESSLER, THE BUREAU: THE SECRET HISTORY
OF THE F.B.I. 225 (2002).
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material,34 and government agents had an alarming tendency to misuse the
information.35  Afraid of a chilling effect, libraries responded to F.B.I. in-
quiries by training their staff, including volunteers, to refer all questions to
the library director, even when accompanied by an F.B.I. badge, and by
changing their policies to keep minimum patron records.36 States began
passing statutes protecting library records as private.37 F.B.I. agents did not
stop trying to search library patron records.38 At times, F.B.I. agents claimed
that they did not have to comply with the state statutes passed specifically to
protect the privacy of library patron records. 39 For the most part, the statu-
tory protections have proven effective, although court orders have forced
34. See, e.g. Ault, supra note 33, at 1534 (stating that the F.B.I. was never able to justify its Library
Awareness Program with any concrete evidence of its usefulness); KESSLER, supra note 33, at 225 ("In the
end, the program produced very little useful information."). James H. Greer, Assistant Director of the F.B.I.,
claims that there is more justification for the Library Awareness Program, but it is classified and he cannot
reveal it. F.B.I. Counterintelligence Visits to Libraries: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 121 (1989).
35. Law enforcement agents have misused this material for both personal purposes and professionally.
Solove, supra note 6, at 1108. "For example, during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Philadelphia Police
Department (PPD) compiled about 18,000 files on various dissident individuals and groups. During a national
television broadcast, PPD officials disclosed the names of some of the people on whom files were kept." Id.
36. Karen Coyle, Privacy and Library Systems, (2002), at http://www.kcoyle.net/il2002.html (last visited
Jan. 14, 2003).
37. All states except Hawaii, Kentucky, and Oregon have legislation that protects library record privacy.
See, ALA. CODE § 41-8-8-10 (2002); ALASKA STAT. § 40.25.140 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1354
(2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 13-2-701 (Michie 2002); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6267 (West 2002); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 24-72-204 (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 11-25 (2001); DEL. CODE ANN, tit. 29 § 10002 (2002); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 39-108 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 257.261 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-46 (2002); IDAHO CODE
§ 9-340E (Michie 2002); 75 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/1 (2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-3-4 (Michie 2002); IOWA
CODE § 22.7 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-221 (2002); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:13 (West 2002); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27 § 121 (West 2001); MD. CODE ANN., STATE GOV'T §10-616 (2002); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 78, § 7 (2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 397.601-603 (2002); MINN. STAT. § 13.40 (2001); MiSS.
CODE ANN. § 39-3-305 (2002); Mo. REV. STAT. § 182.817 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 22-1-1101-03
(2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84-712.05 (2002); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 239.013 (Michie 2000); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 91-A:15 (2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:73-43.2 (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 18-9 (Michie
2002); N.Y. C.P.L.R. LAW § 4509 (Consol. 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 125-19 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 40-
38-12 (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.432 (West 2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 65, § 1-105 (2003); OR. REV.
STAT. § 192.502 (2001); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 4428 (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 38-2 (2002); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 60-4-10 (Law. Co-op. 2001); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 1-27-3, 14-2-51 (Michie 2002); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 10-8-101-03 (2002); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 552.124 (Vernon 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. §
63-2-302 (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 § 317 (2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 2.2-3705 (Michie 2002); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 42.17.310 (West 2002); W. VA. CODE § 10-1-22 (2002); Wis. STAT. § 43.30 (2001); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 16-4-203 (Michie 2002). These state statutes either specifically provide for library record confi-
dentiality or privacy, or create an exemption from a public record disclosure statute when library records
identify the patron and/or their use of the library. Some of these statutes penalize prohibited disclosure, while
others offer no remedy for improper disclosure. Almost all statutes require librarians to release the records
when presented with a court order. Even Hawaii and Kentucky have provided Opinions of the Attorney Gen-
erals stating that library patron records should be kept private because the individual's right to privacy out-
weighs the public's interest in disclosure of the information. 90 Op. Att'y Gen. 30 (Hi. 1990); 81 Op. Att'y
Gen. 159 (Ky. 2002). For a discussion of the motivation of some states in passing the library record privacy
laws, and the variety of the laws, see FOERSTEL, supra note 1, at 133-50. Contra Paul D. Healey, Chicken
Little at the Reference Desk: The Myth of Librarian Liability, 87 LAW LIBR. J. 515, 527 (1995) ("Any obliga-
tion to protect exchanges at the reference desk derives from ethics, not law.").
38. Ault, supra note 33.
39. Id.
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libraries to release their records 40 and there is at least one instance of a li-
brary's voluntary release of a patron's records. 1
Government agents looking at check-out lists for intelligence pur-
poses can easily misinterpret, and have misinterpreted, 42 research for a
school science project as evidence of terrorist machinations. The F.B.I. di-
rector William S. Sessions admitted that when searching libraries as part of
the Library Awareness Program, 43 the F.B.I. specifically looked for students
working on term papers because those papers "assist[ed] in the SIS (Soviet
Intelligence Services) collection effort and also help[ed] to identify students
who might be potential recruitment targets." 44 Books lists do not tell what a
person's political bent is: the curious mind, trying to know one of last cen-
tury's greatest horrors, might take Mein KampJ45 from a library, which a
government agent could easily misinterpret as evidence of Nazi leanings.
Librarians want library records kept private46 because they fear mis-
interpretation of reading choices and the effect that searches have on readers.
Libraries are meant to "[p]rovid[e] . . . a safe place for the community to
exchange ideas. ' '47  Their records are "not ordinary third-party records like
telephone or bank records. They should not be available to intelligence
agencies just for the asking."4 8
40. In Brown v. Johnston, 328 N.W.2d 510 (Iowa 1983), the Iowa Supreme Court ruled that neither Iowa
Code Chapter 68A protecting the confidentiality of library records nor any librarian privilege barred execution
of a prosecutor's subpoena duces tecum requiring the library's keeper of records to present all records of
persons who checked out certain books. The Court held that the state's interest in finding a person or persons
who had engaged in ritual animal slaughter overrode either the protections of Chapter 68A or the librarian's
privilege. Id. For criticism of this decision's disregard for library patron privacy, see Carolyn M. Hinz,
Comment, Brown v. Johnston: The Unexamined Issue of Privacy in Public Library Circulation Records in
Iowa, 69 IOWA L. REV. 535 (1984).
41. SHIRLEY A. WIEGAND, LIBRARY RECORDS: A RETENTION AND CONFIDENTIALITY GUIDE 1-5 141
(1994) (describing one library's voluntary publication of potentially embarrassing patron circulation informa-
tion in an effort to shame patrons into returning overdue books).
42. FRANK J. DONNER, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE: THE AIMS AND METHODS OF AMERICA'S POLITICAL
INTELLIGENCE SYSTEM 357 (1980). At McClelland's request in 1967 "The ATF scoured the records of urban
books listed under the catalogue heading of explosives or relating to guerrilla warfare." Id. In one case the
ATF flushed the names of two teenagers working on a term paper. Id.
43. For a description of the Library Awareness Program, see supra note 34.
44. Letter from William S. Sessions, Director of F.B.I. to Dr. David R. Bender, Special Libraries Associa-
tion (June 7, 1988), F.B.I. Counterintelligence Visits to Libraries: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 55-57 (1989).
45. ADOLF HITLER, MEIN KAMPF (Stackpole Sons 1939) (1925).
46. See, e.g., AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, CODE OF ETHICS, III, available at http://www.ala.org/
alaorg/oif/ethics.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2003) ("We protect each library user's right to privacy and confi-
dentiality with respect to information sought or received, and materials consulted, borrowed, acquired or
transmitted,"); AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, POLICY MANUAL, Policy 54.15, no. 3, 237, available at
http://www.ala.org/alaorg/oif/polconf.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2003) ("Libraries must protect each user's
right to privacy with respect to information sought or received, and materials consulted, borrowed, or ac-
quired.").
47. Gladys Ann Wells & Melissa Moore, Libraries and the 21st Century: What Forms of Information
Distribution Will Survive?, 697 PRACTISING L. INST./PAT. 945, 962 (2002).
48. F.B.I. Counterintelligence Visits to Libraries: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitu-
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The Supreme Court's interpretation of First Amendment free speech
includes the "right to receive" speech.49 When patrons censor their reading,
that "chilling effect" violates their First Amendment right to receive. 50 If
records are not private, librarians fear that "[t]he effect of forced disclosure
of library records would be to chill citizens' reading of unpopular or contro-
versial books because others might learn of it."
5
'
These searches cause patrons to censor themselves, harming their
First Amendment rights, but have not revealed any intelligence information.
Government investigations of library records have never shown a librarian
guilty of treason 5 or provided other intelligence information. 53  One librar-
ian has complained that "F.B.I. agents harassing librarians in settings that
contain no classified material suggests a gross waste. of national resources.
The librarian's job is to protect the rights of the patron, not to decide which
of its holdings might be 'sensitive' and which of its users might be foreign
operatives. 54 The records show the reading habits of individuals, not infor-
mation about government activity or the official acts of public officials;
therefore they are not useful to intelligence operations.55
Some librarians have gone so far as to argue that the library records
should be private because "user information has had the same level of confi-
dentiality protection as educational and medical records. 56 Proponents for a
tional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 1 (1989) (Statement of Rep. Edwards, Member,
House Comm. on the Judiciary)..
49. The Supreme Court first recognized the "right to receive" information in Martin v. City of Struthers,
319 U.S. 141 (1943). The "right to receive" was also found where government closely supervised a citizen's
exercise of his First Amendment rights, causing the citizen to censor his exercise of that right. Lamont v.
Postmaster General of U.S., 381 U.S. 303 (1965) (holding that a statute requiring anyone receiving communist
literature to register with the U.S. Post Office had the incidental effect of discouraging the free exercise of the
First Amendment right to receive (or a "chilling effect")). Justice Brennan later found that the "right to re-
ceive" "is a necessary predicate to the recipient's meaningful exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and
political freedom." Bd. ofEdu. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 857-58 (1982) (discussing the prohibition of certain
books in school libraries). Philip J. Morin, III has argued that any constraint on patrons' use of the library (a
"chilling effect") violates their right to receive. Philip J. Morin, III, Comment, Why Kreimer Can't Read:
Striking the Proper Balance Between Library Access and Problem Patrons in Kreimer v. Bureau of Police, 46
RUTGERS L. REV. 1845 (1994). Morin's analysis further finds that libraries are "designated public fora" and
that the individual's enjoyment of the library must be balanced against the needs of the community. Id. at
1864-65. If we accept this, then the community's interest in avoiding terrorist inflicted harm must be weighed
against the individual's interest in library record privacy. Solove, however, argues that privacy is a form of
freedom (not an individual right), which means that it cannot be weighed against community interests. Solove,
supra note 6, at 1115-18.
50. By limiting their exposure to certain books, citizens are effectively censoring themselves and there-
fore denied freedom of expression.
51. Brown, 328 N.W.2d at 512.
52. FOERSTEL, supra note 1, at 113.
53. See supra note 34.
54. Kenneth A. Winter, Privacy and the Rights and Responsibilities of Librarians, 1997 ThE KATHARINE
SHARP REV. 4, (1997), available at http://www.lis.uiuc.edu/review/winterl997/winter.htmi (last visited Jan.
14,2003).
55. FOERSTEL, supra note 1, at 124.
56. Wells & Moore, supra note 47, at 961 ("Libraries['] . . user information has had the same level of
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protected relationship status for librarian/patron have a difficult argument to
make because unlike confessionals and doctors' offices, libraries are public
places.
Library records are unique and deserve privacy from government
scrutiny. There is no evidence that government searches of library records
have any value.
D. Traditional Standards for Warrants and Searches
The Fourth Amendment is the starting point for any discussion of war-
rants and searches in the United States. It grants:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.57
Although this Amendment has three possible interpretations, 58 it is un-
derstood to grant the judiciary the power to find some searches reasonable, even
when made without a warrant.59 The Supreme Court has, however, "stated re-
peatedly that warrants are the rule and judicially preferred."6 Under the Fourth
Amendment, citizens have an implied right to privacy; some searches are too
invasive and are therefore unreasonable.6'
Regardless of one's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, a search
generally requires "probable cause," and that government agents specifically
describe the objects they expect to recover in the warrant.62 These requirements
confidentiality protection as educational and medical records, the Patriot [sic] Act violates the libraries funda-
mental value of protecting user privacy."). Ault argues that the librarian/patron relationship should be a pro-
tected relationship like that of doctor/patient or priest/penitent. Ault, supra note 33.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
58. These are:
(1) that the "reasonable" search is one which meets the warrant requirements specified
in the second clause; (2) that the first clause provides an additional restriction by imply-
ing that some searches may be "unreasonable" and therefore not permissible, even when
made under warrant; or (3) that the first clause provides an additional search power, au-
thorizing the judiciary to find some searches "reasonable" even when carried out with-
out a warrant.
JACOB W. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERPRETATION 42-43 (1966).
59. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH & SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 3.1(a) (3d ed.
1996 & Supp. 12002).
60. LAWRENCE C. WADDINGTON, ARREST, SEARCH AND SEIZURE 108 (1974).
61. The Amendment does not indicate what searches are too invasive. As Landynski has observed, "The
search and seizure provision, as finally drafted and adopted, had both the virtue of brevity and the vice of
ambiguity." LANDYNSKI, supra note 58, at 42-43.
62. See id. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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are to ensure that the warrant is not used to harass people, and that agents do not
invade privacy needlessly, without a particular purpose.63 The Fourth Amend-
ment reflects the concern that the American government not continue the colo-
nial British government's use of "general warrants" 64 that were "sufficiently
vague to justify the search of any house, boat, or wagon that seemed appropriate
to the executing officer., 65 Sharing this concern centuries later, courts maintain
a policy of preventing the government from unnecessarily invading the privacy
of its citizens.
From its start in the Bill of Rights, the right to individual privacy suf-
fered growing pains and stretch marks as the twentieth century's technological
leaps forced the law to fit a body its youth never anticipated.66 When the United
States Supreme Court was first faced with the wiretap as a search in Olmstead v.
United States, it created the "trespass" rule: anything that did not physically
invade one's space would not be considered a search for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.67 The Supreme Court later realized that people justifiably relied
on privacy in their phone conversations, and that limiting "searches" to physical
invasions made little sense, so it discarded the trespass rule in Katz v. United
States.68 The Court then held that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not
places.69 Justice Harlan's concurrence in Katz focusing on the defendant's "rea-
sonable expectations of privacy"7° has become the theoretical basis of Fourth
Amendment protection.7
What is private and protected from searches under the Fourth Amend-
ment is contextual: it varies by situation.72 If the potential gain to the commu-
63. TELFORD TAYLOR, Two STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: SEARCH, SEIZURE AND
SURVEILLANCE, AND FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 41 (1969).
64. For an excellent history of warrants and the opinions of the Founding Fathers regarding warrants, see
id. at 24-50. Taylor finds that:
[O]ur constitutional fathers were not concerned about warrantless searches, but about
overreaching warrants .... Far from looking at the warrant as a protection against un-
reasonable searches, they saw it as an authority for unreasonable and oppressive
searches, and sought to confine its issuance and execution in line with the stringent re-
quirements applicable to common-law warrants for stolen goods-an interesting use of
a practice already obsolescent to limit and mitigate a current and dangerous practice.
Id. at 41. Taylor warns that our current practice of viewing warrants as preferable to warrantless searches has
its own dangers. Id. at 46-47.
65. WADDINGTON, supra note 60, at 88. General warrants were also unlimited in scope. Id.
66. For an obvious example, the founding fathers did not have telephones, and could not have anticipated
the problem of whether to extend a privacy right to phone calls.
67. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
68. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
69. Id. The Supreme Court held that: "once it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people-
and not simply "areas"-against unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear that the reach of that
Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Id. at
353.
70. Id. at 361.
71. LAFAVE, supra note 59, at § 3.1(a).
72. Patricia Mell, Is Privacy Obsolete in a Nation Fighting Terrorism? Address Before the American
20031
Journal of Legislation [Vol. 29:2
nity does not outweigh the harm of intruding on an individual's privacy, then
that search is unreasonable.
Library records rely on Fourth Amendment protections, and a warrant to
search these records must balance individual privacy against the community's
interest in the search.73 Do people have a reasonable expectation of privacy in
the library's records of their activities? Almost all states have legislation to
protect the privacy of library patron records, showing that they value this pri-
vacy.74 These statutes protecting library record privacy usually provide an ex-
ception to that privacy in the case of court orders. 75  A court order requires a
showing of probable cause that the search will find its object and is necessary to
the investigation.76 In our legal tradition's policy of encouraging disclosure,
courts hearing warrant requests are usually open to the public. The publicity
acts as a check on the parties' actions. 77 To some degree, defendants can chal-
lenge the accuracy of the facts in the warrant affidavit, 78 but third parties sub-
jected to a search have no right to challenge a warrant.79
In addition to states' recognition of the need for library patron record
privacy, courts have found that patrons have a right to privacy in their reading
choices, 0 and that privacy right has variously outweighed t or been subordi-
Association of Law Schools 2003 Annual Meeting (Jan. 4, 2003) (forthcoming MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 2003).
73. The Fourth Amendment applies because the legal theories of third party records and bailment fail to
protect library records. The Supreme Court allows warrants to search third parties because "whether the third-
party occupant is suspect or not, the State's interest in enforcing the criminal law and recovering the evidence
remains the same." Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 560 (1978). The Court rejected the District
Court's contention that third parties should not be subjected to warrants and that a subpoena duces tecum
would better protect the third party's privacy interest and be a more appropriate method of gaining informa-
tion. Id. Justice Stevens' dissent argued that the framers could not have meant to subject third parties to
warrants because from the time Fourth Amendment was written and down to the time of Hayden, seizures of
private papers were generally not permissible, and so it is understandable that "the Warrant Clause was not
framed to protect against them." Id. at 578 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294
(1967)). The theory of bailment could protect library patron records if patrons gave information to the library
with the reasonable expectation that the library would not share the information with outsiders. See Rawlings
v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). The case United States v. Miller throws doubt on the possibility ofbailment,
however, because the Miller court found that bailment did not protect bank records. 425 U.S. 435 (1976)
(finding that defendant, who had not registered or paid taxes on his whiskey business, had no protectable
Fourth Amendment interest in bank records). If bailment does not protect bank records, then it probably does
not protect library records either. A library's only hope of preventing a chilling effect on its patrons is by
showing that a search of library patron records is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
74. See supra note 37.
75. Id.
76. FRANK W. MILLER ET AL., THE POLICE FUNCTION 120 (6th ed. 2000).
77. Judges are carefully selected individuals, appointed because people perceive them as capable of re-
maining impartial and making fair judgments. However, judges are only human and capable of error. Senator
McCarthy, famous for inventing evidence he used in his communist hunts, was a judge for four years.
ROVERE, supra note 30, at 89. While we trust judges, making them work in the public eye can only improve
their performance.
78. Id. at 132-44.
79. LAFAVE, supra note 59, at § 4.1 (f).
80. Brown, 328 N.W.2d at 512, Tattered Cover v. City ofThomton, 44 P.3d 1044, 1055 (Colo. 2002).
81. Tattered Cover, 44 P.3d at 1056 (holding that even with specificity in the warrant application, state
law protected patron's right to privacy of reading material that outweighed state's interest in linking the sus-
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nated to society's need for the information.82 Courts agree that reading materi-
als implicate the First Amendment in searches of library records, and therefore
the search must meet the Fourth Amendment's particularity requirements with
"scrupulous exactitude. '' 83
State legislatures and courts apply a higher standard to searches of li-
brary patron records. The USA PATRIOT Act strips this higher protection from
library records.
III. SO WHAT IS THE PROBLEM?
The USA PATRIOT Act allows the Federal government to conduct
searches that are illegal under state law.84 It changes the standard for searches
of library patron records because searches under the Act do not require probable
cause or a specific description of the object of the search. The lower standards
for searches create two problems: first, stripping the protection of a higher
search standard from library patron records risks a chilling effect on patrons'
library use. Second, the Act gives the executive branch broad powers, ignoring
our government's system of checks and balances.
If there is a declaration of war, the government can strip or alter basic
constitutional rights, such as the Fourth Amendment protection from unreason-
able searches.85 This is not the case now.86  Although President Bush speaks
often of the "war on terrorism," there has not been a declaration of war and there
is no war justification for suspending basic constitutional rights such as the
Fourth Amendment.87 Even if a state of war did exist, there is no evidence that
the government has a compelling need to access library patron records. USA
peet to the crime scene).
82. Brown, 328 N.W.2d at 512 (holding that the investigation was sufficiently narrow, and society's need
to find a person or persons who had engaged in ritual animal slaughter overrode either the state law protections
or the librarian's privilege).
83. Tattered Cover, 44 P.3d at 1056 (citing Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1978)).
84. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
85. Lisa M. Ivey, Comment, Ready, Aim, Fire? The President's Executive Order Authorizing Detention,
Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism is a Powerful Weapon, But Should
It Be Upheld? 33 CUMB. L. REV. 107 (2002-2003).
86. Id.
87. Congress alone has the power to declare war, and has not done so. Id. As one author has pointed out,
the absence of a declaration of war leaves America with nothing but ambiguity:
President Bush's guarantee of a 'long, long struggle,' absent a measurable goal, and
without a quantifiable conclusion, suggests that America will be in a permanent milita-
rized state until the end of our days, forever erasing the distinction between 'war time'
and 'peace time.' . . . With no legal declaration of war, there can be no cessation of hos-
tilities. With no nations from which to demand surrender, there will be no surrender
ceremonies.
DAVID POTORTI, Coming to a Mall Near You. Just War, in SEPTEMBER I I AND THE U.S. WAR: BEYOND THE
CURTAIN OF SMOKE 99, 99 (Roger Burbach & Ben Clarke eds., 2002).
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PATRIOT Act searches of library patron records should stay within constitu-
tional limits on searches.
A. Overbroad Scope of the USA PATRIOT Act
By not requiring probable cause, the government can use the USA
PATRIOT Act to conduct searches on anyone, anywhere, so long as a govern-
ment agent suspects that person of being somehow involved in terrorist investi-
gations. The degree of suspicion does not need to be reasonable to get a war-
rant. The USA PATRIOT Act disregards precedent by allowing searches of
places, not people, and by eliminating the Fourth Amendment's probable cause
and particularity requirements.
1. What Ever Happened to Probable Cause?
Although suspicion might be sufficient grounds to make a decision
in private interactions, the legal profession finds instinct-based suspicions
too specious to justify the invasion of one's privacy. Traditionally, a gov-
ernment agent needed some convincing reason to suspect someone of com-
mitting a crime, and had to present that reason to an impartial judge before
getting a warrant to invade that person's privacy.
Past legislation relaxed the probable cause requirement in searches
of foreign nationals, 88 but the USA PATRIOT Act lowers protection of its
citizens in a whole new way. Under FISA,89 the government granted its ex-
ecutive branch broader powers to investigate terrorism. FISA allows war-
rants for electronic surveillance if the primary purpose of the surveillance is
intelligence gathering and the target is a foreign power or an agent of a for-
eign power (including terrorist groups). 90 FISA Courts have found that the
Act passes muster: it does not violate citizens' Fourth Amendment rights,
and the lower FISA standard for foreign nationals is justified by the state's
interest in combating foreign terrorism.91
88. The probable cause requirement was lowered in searches of foreign nationals when terrorism was the
purpose of the search. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") of 1978, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801-
1811 (1994 & Supp. 1999), 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2000), 47 U.S.C. §§ 605-606, and in scattered sections of 18
U.S.C.
89. Id.
90. Michael T. McCarthy, USA PATRIOT ACT, 39 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 435, 443 (2002) (citing 50
U.S.C.A. §§ 1805, 1801(b)(2)(c)). The USA PATRIOT Act lowered the already low FISA standardby replac-
ing "purpose" with "significant purpose," which made it possible to use conduct searches not based wholly on
terrorism-related cases. Id. at 444.
91. In re: Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 745 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct. 2002).
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The USA PATRIOT Act, however, creates a standard, lower than
that of the FISA standard. It allows searches "relevant to an ongoing crimi-
nal investigation,, 92 where terrorism is "a significant purpose ' 93 of the
search, and the search is not "conducted of a United States person solely
upon the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment." 94 This is an
unprecedented low level of proof: "relevant" could mean just about any-
thing. Terrorism no longer needs to be the only purpose of the investigation
to obtain this information. 95
It is hard to imagine why the U.S. government needs to extend these
broad powers to searches when terrorism is not the only alleged crime and
not the only purpose: what other purposes are valid to invoke the awesome
search powers in this Act? Even more frightening, is the provision stating
that the search cannot be "solely" based on First Amendment activities. This
leaves the possibility that First Amendment activities could be a large factor
in the search. The Act exposes foreign nationals to investigations based
solely on First Amendment protected acts.96 If anything has a chilling effect
on people's exercise of their First Amendment rights, it is this provision:
when we think that the government will invade our privacy just because we
have spoken freely, or read a book that a government agent views as suspi-
cious, then we will refrain from these activities. We will begin to fear our
government-that it might misinterpret a book we have read and, like Or-
well's Big Brother,97 punish us for exercising our constitutional right to ideo-
logical freedom. The missing probable cause standard allows searches that
the Fourth Amendment is intended to prevent.
92. USA PATRIOT Act of2001 § 216, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3123.
93. USA PATRIOT Act of2001 § 218, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1804, 1823 (changing "purpose" to "a significant
purpose").
94. USA PATRIOT Act of200i § 215,50 U.S.C.A. § 1861.
95. Bonta, supra note 5.
96. By limiting the requirement that the searches are not based solely on First Amendment activities to
citizens, the Act leaves open the possibility that foreign nationals residing in the USA will be subject to
searches, based solely on that foreign nationals' First Amendment activities in the USA. USA PATRIOT Act
of 2001 § 215, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861. For example, a Swiss national residing in the USA could be the subject of
a USA PATRIOT Act investigation because she wrote a letter to the editor of a newspaper that questioned
President Bush's motivation in the proposed attack on Iraq. This would be completely unrelated to terrorist
activity, the search would authorized based only on the person's exercise of fieedom of speech. This person
would then be subject to phone taps, her e-mails could be captured and read without her knowledge, a warrant
could be granted to look at the records in the library she frequents, and the bank she uses. When examining
those bank and library records, the agent will have access to records of hundreds of other citizens although no
one suspects those citizens of committing a crime. This scenario is highly unlikely, but under the USA
PATRIOT Act it is possible.
97. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR (Penguin Books 1954) (1949).
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2. Probable Cause Exceptions Do Not Apply
There are exceptions to the probable cause requirement. To decide if
probable cause is required, the court will apply a balancing test looking at:
the intrusiveness of the search, the nature of the harm investigated, the diffi-
culty of detecting the harm if probable cause is required, and the extent to
which a probable cause requirement would disrupt smooth government func-
tioning. 98
A search of library records is not the same as a search of one's home,
but it is intrusive nonetheless. The book that one reads is a matter of per-
sonal choice. If someone knows he will be judged by the book he reads, he
will choose reading material based on how he thinks others will interpret that
book choice. He will not choose a book based on what he wants to read, the
chilling effect will occur and curtail the intellectual freedom that our society
values.
USA PATRIOT Act searches investigates harm to prevent terrorist
activities; terrorism has cost thousands of lives in the past decade and could
cause thousands more. The value of knowing what books one has read in a
terrorist investigation, however, is dubious. It is as reliable as deciding a
person is Moslem because they do not eat pork. Plenty of people avoid pork
for non-religious reasons, but one cannot distinguish the reason when only
given their food choice. Because of the dubious value of reading lists in
investigations of potential terrorism, the harm investigated by USA
PATRIOT Act searches is better seen as the exercise of one's right to re-
ceive, in which case the harm is very low.
A probable cause requirement would make these searches more diffi-
cult because the value is so speculative: the higher standard would make a
court take more care analyzing the value of the search before it allowed a
library search in a terrorist investigation.
The dubious value of these searches means that probable cause is
even more necessary in library patron record searches. Despite the dangers
of misinterpreting patron records and the lack of evidence that patron records
help intelligence investigations, the F.B.I. is reputedly using its USA
PATRIOT Act powers to search library records. 99
As for the degree to which probable cause requirement would disrupt
smooth government flunctioning, it is not clear that this would interrupt gov-
ernment functioning at all: the value of these records is so tenuous, an inves-
98. CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: AN ANALYSIS OF
CASES AND CONCEPTS 140 (4th ed. 2000).
99. See supra note 28.
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tigation might even be better off without the records, focusing on more
clearly probative evidence instead.
Looking at the courts' factors, library patron record searches for a
terrorist investigation do not fit into the probable cause exception: while the
nature of the harm investigated is potentially severe, the search is too intru-
sive, the risk of a chilling effect too great and the value of this search's re-
sults are too questionable to justify facilitating this type of search. Nonethe-
less, because of the USA PATRIOT Act, almost anyone is the possible target
of a search, provided the government can show that there is a chance of ter-
rorist activity, and the search is not entirely based on that person's First
Amendment protected activities.
3. Eliminating the Particularity Requirement
After probable cause is established, the Fourth Amendment requires that
a warrant request "particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the per-
sons or things to be seized."'l The court will not issue a general warrant: the
agent must be able to describe precisely what the investigating officers expect to
find. For example, when a New York Judge issued a warrant for "obscene ob-
jects" and then accompanied police officers to add items to the warrant list
while the search was in progress, he found himself the subject of a Supreme
Court reprimand. 101 The Supreme Court found that the judge's presence during
the search ruined his impartiality and the judge could not objectively decide if
the search was reasonable.'0 2 The specificity requirement leaves citizens open
to government harassment, or warrant abuse.0 3 The USA PATRIOT Act, how-
ever, does not require specificity; the government can use these warrants for the
"production of any tangible things."' 4 As one author described the problem:
100. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
101. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. N.Y., 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
102. Id.
103. This stripping away of non-suspect citizens' Fourth Amendment rights is compounded by the USA
PATRIOT Act's failure to recognize the Supreme Court's holding in the landmark case Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347 (1967) that Fourth Amendment protections are for people, not places. Ignoring this, the USA
PATRIOT Act authorizes searches of business records "for an investigation to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities." USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 215, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861. It
took people out of the equation. This, in conjunction with the lack of particularity requirement, opens up non-
suspected persons to searches that effectively ignore their Fourth Amendment protections. FISA and
OCCSSA, gave law enforcement officials broad powers to collect information on terrorists and their activities.
These measures were sufficient, in fact, to gather information on the September 11 attacks: the government
failed to prevent the attacks not because of a lack of information, but because agencies did not share their
information (the new Department of Homeland Security is meant to remedy this problem) and the warnings
that did exist went unheeded. McCarthy, supra note 89, at 441.
104. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 215,50 U.S.C.A. § 1861.
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Previously, the F.B.I. could get the credit records of anyone suspected
of being an international terrorist. Under the new 2001 legislation, the
F.B.I. can get the entire database of the credit card company. It can go
into a public library and ask for the records on everybody who ever
used the library, or who used it on a certain day, or who checked out
certain kinds of books.'
0 5
It is unclear why the US government might need access to all bank re-
cords at a bank that might possibly have records on one terrorist: such a broad
search warrant easily results in a "fishing expedition." This exposes innocent
citizens to invasions of privacy the government has historically justified only for
the most criminal of suspects.
B. Unchecked Executive Branch Power under the USA PATRIOT Act
In addition to being overbroad, the USA PATRIOT Act creates an im-
balance between the three branches of government. It gives broad power to the
executive branch. For example, it allows the executive branch to initiate emer-
gency searches, with minimal oversight by the judicial branch. The lowered
requirements make the executive's job easier, but that is not necessarily prudent.
Each branch of government has a carefully defined role and can check the others
to prevent abuse of power.
In Marbury v. Madison, the Supreme Court established its power to
overrule legislation as unconstitutional. 106 A court can only check the legislative
and executive branches if someone challenges an act of those branches in a case
before its bench. 0 7 The USA PATRIOT Act allows judicial review before a
warrant issues and a library search begins. 10 8 This is acceptable, but afterwards,
no one can tell anyone that a search has occurred, 10 9 and "[t]here can be no pub-
lic outcry and congressional pressure over abuse of secret FISA warrants if tar-
gets are unaware of the surveillance."" 0 Because they are the subjects of the
search, patrons would be the only parties with standing to challenge the war-
rant," 1 but the patron's ignorance of the investigation means that he or she can-
105. Dempsey, supra note 14, at 9.
106. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
107. Because it has already passed into law, the opportunity for an executive veto on the legislation has
passed. The only available executive checks on the USA PATRIOT Act are the executive branch's use of the
Act (it can choose not to exercise the full power that Congress granted, which is unlikely since the executive
proposed the Act and even wanted looser checks on its power) or a judicial ruling saying the Act is unconstitu-
tional.
108. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
110. McCarthy, supra note 89, at 452.
111. In order to bring a case in court, one must have "standing" which requires that the plaintiff suffer "an
'injury in fact'-an invasion of a legally-protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
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not challenge the warrant in court. 1 12 Librarians, as third parties, cannot chal-
lenge the warrant. 113 The patron, the only party with standing to challenge the
warrant or the USA PATRIOT Act's provisions affecting citizens' rights and
creating overbroad executive power, has no chance to be heard in court. No one
is in a position to challenge the executive's use of USA PATRIOT Act searches.
The government has already misused these searches. As a result,
judges have accused agents of lying in warrant applications." 4 Obtaining a
warrant is so easy that, it is hard to believe that agents fabricate information
to get a warrant when probable cause is not even required.
The Act allows for a tort cause of action against government officials
who improperly reveal sensitive information."t 5 However, the problem is
that this remedy comes after the harm has occurred. The agents should not
collect the information in the first place.
IV. CHANGING THE USA PATRIOT ACT: SOLUTIONS TO PROTECT
LIBRARY PATRON RECORD PRIVACY
The USA PATRIOT Act is overinclusive insofar as it ignores our ba-
sic Fourth Amendment right to privacy, and freedom from unreasonably
broad searches conducted without probable cause. The "war on terrorism" is
not an official war-it has not met the constitutional provisions requiring a
declaration of war and the government cannot strip Fourth Amendment
rights with the justification of war." 6 Because no one knows if he or she is
the subject of a USA PATRIOT Act search, no one can challenge the consti-
'actual or imminent, not "conjectural" or "hypothetical."' [citations omitted] Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 555-56 (1992). Because the patron, not the librarian, suffers any injury from unreasonably
invasive warrants in this case, the patron and not the librarian would be the party with "standing" who could
bring the injustice to court. While there is a gag order, the patron will not know that an agent is searching
records of books they have read.
112. One must know about a warrant to contest its use. The Supreme Court has held that an individual has
a right to notice that a warrant was used to seize their property so that "the owner can pursue available reme-
dies for its return." City of West Covina v. Perkins, 525 U.S. 234, 240 (1999). The USA PATRIOT Act gag
order denies citizens any chance of notice, and thus any chance to challenge an improperly used warrant.
113. While librarians cannot challenge a warrant, they could challenge a subpoena. For this reason, a
subpoena might be a better way for the government to access these records: a subpoena would not be secret,
and the library could challenge the subpoena in court before it was executed. However, a subpoena is only
used when a case is being tried, not in an investigation, and the subpoena is usually only reviewed by a judge
if the subject of the subpoena protests (a grand jury subpoena would be the exception to this general rule).
Although it would have the benefit of less secrecy, the requirement of a court case to use a subpoena would
ruin the government's investigatory purpose, and it is not an ideal solution.
114. Dan Eggen & Susan Schmidt, Secret Court Rebuffs Ashcroft: Justice Dept. Chided On Misinforma-
tion, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2002, at AO1.
115. McCarthy, supra note 89, at 439.
116. Furthermore, the "war on terrorism" has no time boundaries, rendering problematic the Act's "sunset
clause" termination date of December 31, 2005. USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 § 224. If for some reason the
"war on terrorism" ended before that date, the Act's extraordinary provisions would be without the superficial
justification of "war" it now has.
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tutionality of the Act in court. It is unlikely that the executive branch that
requested this power will check itself and resist infringing on Fourth
Amendment protected privacy. The only way to correct the overinclusive
scope of the USA PATRIOT Act and give privacy back to Americans is
through a congressional amendment to the Act. Congressmen should be
asked to amend the USA PATRIOT Act to protect to the privacy of library
patron records.
There are many approaches Congress can take to return privacy to li-
brary patron records. Critics have proposed solutions to the Act's blemishes.
One solution comes from Congress itself and another from the American
Library Association. I will present these proposals and then offer my own
suggestion to remedy the Act's overinclusive application to library patron
records.
A. The Congressional Solution
After rushing the USA PATRIOT Act through, Congress saw some
problems with the USA PATRIOT Act. 1 7 In the House Judiciary Commit-
tee's open letter to the Attorney General requesting information on the Act's
usage, question 12 of the letter addressed the investigation of library re-
cords.'1 8  This letter mentions two potential safeguards against misuse: a
requirement of supervisory approval when seeking information from librar-
ies, and a determination that the information could not be obtained through
means other than the search.' 9 A supervisory approval requirement for li-
brary searches would still leave the broad search power in the executive
branch. If an agent first determined that there were no other less intrusive
means of obtaining the information, abuse of these searches would be less
likely. Although sufficient, these recommendations do not go far enough:
they leave the unchecked executive powers in place, and there is still the
chance that Fourth Amendment rights will be ignored if there are no other
less intrusive means of obtaining the information.
117. Letter from F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., House Judiciary Committee Chairman, & John Conoyers, Jr.,
Ranking Member of House Judiciary Committee, to U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft (June 13, 2002),
available at http://www.house.gov/judiciary/ashcroft06l302.htm.
118. Id.
119. These recommendations support Michael McCarthy's speculation that many provisions of the bill are
over-inclusive because of the speed of the Act's passage and the climate at the time: Capitol Hill was in chaos
due to the anthrax threat, and legislators lacked the time and opportunity to develop complex definitions that
would avoid over or under-inclusiveness. McCarthy, supra note 89, at 451. McCarthy also excuses the Act's
breadth by saying that Congress felt that the executive would limit its own power. Id. These are poor excuses:
the chaotic climate should have made Congress especially careful with the Act, and it contradicts our govern-
ment's structure to let one branch "check" its own use of power.
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B. The American Library Association's Solution
Probably no group has a greater interest in changing the USA
PATRIOT Act than the American Library Association. Librarians have a
strong interest in maintaining patrons' free access to books. The American
Library Association pushed for the state statutes that kept library records
confidential. A very active organization, it has not held back its criticism for
the USA PATRIOT Act. 120  In a letter to Congress before the Act was
passed, the American Library Association along with the American Law Li-
brary Association and the American Research Library Association asked
Congress to maintain the "high standard for obtaining a court order requiring
the release of library records. 121 That recommendation was not heeded.
Since the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act, the American Library
Association has recommended that libraries have a plan for dealing with a
search warrant including a chain of command or a designated library privacy
officer. 122  The American Library Association further recommends that li-
brarians insist on having legal counsel present before complying with a war-
rant, that libraries keep records of patron information at a minimum, and that
libraries periodically destroy such records. 1
23
There are some problems with these recommendations: first, the sub-
ject of a warrant might not be able to stall a search until an attorney is pre-
sent. Second, the recommendation to keep records holding patron informa-
tion at a minimum hinders the library's development of patron services.
124
Libraries will be unable to collect information that they would use to cus-
tomize user services, track information to assess and improve library ser-
120. See, e.g., Letter from The American Association of Law Libraries et al., to U.S. Congress (Oct. 2,
2001), available at http://www.ala.org/washoff/patriot.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2003).
121. The American Association of Law Libraries, American Library Association and Association of Re-
search Libraries together in an open letter to Congress pled against the USA PATRIOT Act's passage. Id.
("We are concerned that some of the legislation proposed thus far threatens the rights of the public and under-
mines the confidentiality that is crucial for the flow of information needed for the provision of library services
and importantly, the vitality of our democracy"). The American Library Association was not alone when it
asked Congress to keep high standards for searches of library records. The ACLU also wrote a letter to Con-
gress before it passed the Act, asking Congress to ignore Ashcroft's push for haste, and instead to deliberate
on the potential harm the Act's breadth could inflict on civil liberties. Letter from Laura W. Murphy, Director,
ACLU Washington Office & Gregory T. Nojeim, Associate Director & Chief Legislative Counsel, ACLU, to
U.S. House of Representatives (Oct. 23, 2001), available at http://www.aclu.org/congress/l02301a.html (last
visited Oct. 14, 2002).
122. AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, POLICY ON CONFIDENTIALITY OF LIBRARY RECORDS, available
at http://www.ala.org/alaorg/oif/polconf.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2003).
123. Id. Libraries around the country have followed this advice. One librarian stated that his library now
destroys all patron records that are more than thirty-five days old. He cannot destroy them after a shorter time,
he needs the backup--the records proved invaluable in a recent computer crash.
124. Coyle, supra note 36.
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vices, and run systems in an efficient and cost effective manner. 25 Even
more worrying, if a library does not maintain thorough records, it will be
unable to monitor its system use to detect intrusions and identify those who
have used systems for illegal or harmful purposes.
126
Some also advocate informing users that a USA PATRIOT Act
search could violate the privacy of the library's records containing their user
information. 127 Libraries should let users know that their records cannot be
kept confidential, but warning patrons of the lack of confidentiality means
that the librarian's fears of a chilling effect will almost certainly be realized.
C. A Different Approach
Congress makes decent recommendations, but they are not sufficient.
They still allow library searches under a low standard inconsistent with our
Fourth Amendment rights. The American Library Association solutions are not
comprehensive enough. They leave in place the problematic provisions and try
to minimize their effects.
Instead of using patches to mask the negative effects of the Act, I sug-
gest amending the USA PATRIOT Act to specify an exception for library patron
records to the searchable "business records."'' 2 8 This method of protecting li-
brary records has been used in Britain's Anti-Terrorism Act's "special proce-
dure material" exception. 129  This exception recognizes that certain records
"covering anything that a person acquired in the course of his trade, business or
employment, and which he holds subject to an express or implied undertaking to
keep it confidential" should have closer scrutiny before they are searched.130 In
order to search "special procedure material, a circuit judge must find that the
information adds substantial value to the investigation of a serious offense, that
other methods of obtaining access to the material would clearly not succeed, and
that the search is in the public interest and outweighs any harm to confidential
relationships.' This exception protects library records because librarians ac-
quire patron information in their work, and have expressly undertaken to keep
that information confidential. 32 In adopting such an exception to the USA
PATRIOT Act, Congress could narrow the description of "special procedure
material" so that the exception applies only to libraries, and not to other busi-
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. USA PATRIOT Act of2001 § 215, 50 U.S.C.A. § 1861.
129. CLIVE WALKER, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION 43 (2002).
130. Id. at 43-44.
131. WALKER, supra note 129, at 44.
132. See AMERICAN LIBRARY ASSOCIATION, supra note 46.
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nesses if it fears that such an exception would limit government agents too much
in their searches.133  A legislatively-imposed rigorous standard such as this
would restore patron confidence in the confidentiality of library patron records,
preventing a chilling effect. Such an exception would acknowledge the impor-
tance of these records.
Creating a special records exception to USA PATRIOT Act searches
would restore the scrutiny traditionally given to library records searches. The
use of a circuit judge, not a private court, means that the warrant request and
hearing will be public, and the judge and government agents will be more care-
ful in their actions. The agent will have to prove more than that terrorism is a
significant purpose of the search. The agent would have to show what "prob-
able cause" is by showing that the information sought is of substantial value to
the investigation.
The agent will also have to show that other methods of obtaining the
material will not succeed. This is similar to Congress' suggestion that agents
show that no other means will obtain the information targeted in the search.
This requirement means that agents will have to think through other options and
cannot invade a citizen's privacy only because it is the easiest way to get the
information. Implicit in this requirement is the idea that the agent's search is
targeting information with particularity, which will prevent the warrant from
being misused for a "fishing expedition."
Weighing the public interest against the potential harm to confidential
relationships would return library records to the protection they have previously
had: as has been discussed above, the harm of a chilling effect generally out-
weighs any speculative value in a search of library patron records. This extra
scrutiny will reduce searches of library patron records to only the most essential
searches. The higher standard will restore public confidence in the privacy of
their records and negate any chilling effect.
The special records exception will also have the value of restoring the
balance of power in the government's branches. When a circuit judge's ap-
proval is required before a search of library records, the government agent can-
not initiate an "emergency search" of these records. Additionally, the fact that
the hearing is in public, not in a secret or distant court, means that citizens will
be aware of these searches and have standing to challenge the violation of their
library record privacy by use of the Act.
133. For example, the rigorous "special procedure material" standard as defined in Britain's Anti-
Terrorism Act could apply to bank records and telephone records. Bank and telephone record privacy or lack
thereof arguably does not affect citizens' First Amendment rights the same way that a lack of privacy in li-
brary patron records would, so Congress might like to retain the lowered search standard for bank records and
telephone records, limiting the "special procedures material" higher standard to searches of library patron
records.
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Ideally, library patron records will never be subject to government su-
pervision: reading books should never be a crime, or have criminal implications.
Library books are unclassified. A person can look at these books in the library
and not have it on their record, or buy the book with cash at a bookstore: library
check-out lists do not have probative value. If the government feels that it needs
to know the detai.s of someone's library activities, then there is a high risk of a
chilling effect negating intellectual freedom, which a court should rigorously
scrutinize. We should worry about protecting citizens' liberties, not about mak-
ing an intelligence agent's job easier.
V. CONCLUSION
The USA PATRIOT Act, as it applies to library patron records, strips
away too many American liberties. Library records are not as valuable to a ter-
rorist investigation as, for example, bank records may be. There is a great risk
that by exposing library patron information to unjustifiably low-standard
searches, there will be a chilling effect. Although searches pursuant to the USA
PATRIOT Act are terrorist searches, "the security of the Nation is not at the
ramparts alone. Security also lies in the value of our free institutions.,,134 The
USA PATRIOT Act should be amended to exempt library patron records from
special searches. There is no compelling reason to discard the old standards of
probable cause and particularity and there is every reason to maintain intellec-
tual liberty by protecting these records from unnecessary searches.
134. United States v. New York Times Co., 328 F. Supp. 324, 325 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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